We study the optimality of debt through the interaction between security design and information acquisition. An impatient seller designs an asset backed security and a buyer decides whether to buy it to provide liquidity. Facing di¤erent securities, the buyer has incentives to acquire information from di¤erent aspects of the fundamental, which in turn affects security design. Speci…cally, the buyer bene…ts from information acquisition at the expense of the seller through adverse selection. The seller hence deliberately designs the security to induce the buyer to acquire the information least harmful to the seller's interest. This interaction is ‡exible since securities can be designed in arbitrary ways. Flexible information acquisition is introduced to capture this ‡exible interaction and debt is shown to be uniquely optimal. Compared with the security design literature, we neither restrict coverage to non-decreasing securities nor impose various distributional assumptions on the fundamental or information structures. Fixed aggregate cash ‡ow and homogeneous information cost are two key factors driving the results.
Introduction
Tranched debts in the asset-backed security (ABS) market are prevalent for raising liquidity. One prominent feature of this market is that some parties are often sophisticated, so that they actively acquire information to evaluate the securities proposed by their counterparties. Di¤erent securities provide di¤erent incentives to acquire information about di¤erent aspects of the fundamental, which in turn a¤ects the incentive of security design. This gives rise to a natural interaction between security design and information acquisition, a new perspective as the theme of this paper. We propose a framework to capture this interaction and establish the unique optimality of debt in a liquidity provision setting involving endogenous adverse selection caused by information acquisition. This new perspective stands this paper out of past literature (e.g., DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) , DeMarzo (2005) ), in which the sellers design securities to alleviate adverse selection caused by their endowed private information.
The benchmark model throughout this paper is as follows. A risk-neutral seller owns an asset that generates an uncertain future cash ‡ow. The seller is impatient and wants to raise liquidity by issuing an asset-backed security (ABS) to a risk-neutral buyer. The seller proposes an ABS, setting its price, as a takeit-or-leave-it o¤er. Then the buyer decides whether to accept the o¤er. In this model, a key feature is that the buyer has the potential to gain information advantage and evaluate the security before making a decision. Such a modeling approach has been pioneered and justi…ed by Axelson (2007) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) . However, our paper di¤ers from them in many aspects and contributes to the literature from di¤erent fronts. We further enrich our model to examine the switch of roles of seller and buyer as well as the case with multiple assets, showing that debt is a robust and unique means for mitigating endogenous adverse selection and hence providing liquidity.
The key to understand the contribution of our paper is to reveal the buyer's ‡exible incentive of acquiring information when facing the security proposed by the seller. Di¤erent securities promise di¤erent payo¤ structures across the states, which make the states di¤erent in terms of their payo¤ relevance. Hence, the buyer has a naturally ‡exible incentive to put di¤erent degrees of attention on di¤erent states. This ‡exibility makes intuitive sense. For example, a debt holder would pay attention mainly to bad states as the only consideration is the default risk, since the payment is always the face value regardless of the state once it is good enough. In contrast, an equity holder will pay more attention to good states, given the greater bene…t from upside payments. For an arbitrary security, the buyer's incentive to acquire information, i.e., allocation of attention, would be determined accordingly, in turn a¤ecting the seller's incentives in designing the security. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) also models the buyer as an information expert who may acquire information, but in an allor-not technology, in which the buyer either acquires a speci…c signal on the fundamental state or gets no information whatever. This approach makes a good attempt to model information acquisition and its impact on security design, but fails to capture the ‡exible incentive in acquiring information and prevents their work from delivering a robust optimality of debt.
Instead, our paper models ‡exible information acquisition through the paradigm of rational inattention, building upon Sims (1998) , Sims (2003) , and Woodford (2009) , where the agents can arrange to receive a costly signal that maybe related to the fundamental state in a fairly arbitrary way. Here the ‡exibility, modeled as the ability to choose any information structure 1 , enables the buyer to acquire payo¤-relevant information de…ned by the payo¤ structure of the proposed security while economize on irrelevant information. As the seller is able to design a security ‡exibly that leads to ‡exible incentives, a su¢ ciently ‡exible characterization of information acquisition is essential to capture the potential variety of attention allocation by the buyer. Our approach of ‡exible information acquisition thus …ts this purpose well, while the traditional approach of exogenous information asymmetry is obviously inadequate. Moreover, recent models of information acquisition also fail to accommodate such ‡exibility of incentive, since they implicitly impose some rigid information acquisition technologies with restrictions on signals (Veldkamp (2011) ).
Although our approach of ‡exible information acquisition employes rational inattention as a foundation, it has a di¤erent focus. The traditional rational inattention concept mainly captures the irrationality of the representative agent in macroeconomic models where limited attention leads to rigidity-related phenomena (e.g., Sims (1998) , Sims (2003) , Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) and Woodford (2009) ). Instead, we highlight the agents' capacity to allocate attention in a ‡exible way to study how information acquisition is determined by and in turn determines the payo¤ structures in a multi-agent setting. This feature of strategic interaction is not present in past macroeconomic literature employing rational inattention. Our paper also contributes to the literature of rational inattention methodologically by providing a formal proof for the main result in , and developing a non-trivial framework to introduce the techniques that are previously suitable for single-person decision problems to multi-agent strategic settings.
Thanks to ‡exible information acquisition, our paper establishes the unique optimality of debt. Compared with the classical security design literature, our results are clearer. We neither restrict coverage to non-decreasing securities nor impose various distributional assumptions on the underlying cash ‡ow or information structures, such as MLRP. Instead, these properties of the optimal security are justi…ed in equilibrium.
Both Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) and our model show that debt is optimal, but the mechanisms behind the two models are completely di¤erent. In Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , what matters for information acquisition and thus the optimality of the securities is the liability constraint, namely, the 45 degree line. Hence, there also exist in…nitely many other securities that follow the 45 degree line in bad states but deliver fairly arbitrary ‡uctuating payo¤s in good states, called "quasi-debts", which are just as optimal as the standard debt. Those quasi-debts correspond to various non-debt-like securities in reality and may not be actually information insensitive in a common sense. On the contrary, in our model, the mechanism to render debt as information insensitive and thus uniquely optimal relies on the ‡at tail of debt, instead of the liability constraint. Speci…cally, since the buyer naturally has incentive to acquire information when facing state-contingent payo¤s, the best way to discourage information acquisition is to make the payo¤ constant across all states. This gives rise to the ‡at tail, the de…ning feature of debt in our model. Once the state is too bad to support the constant payo¤, the limited liability constraint binds and gives rise to the 45-degree-line part of debt. The di¤erence between these two mechanisms stems from their ways to model information acquisition. The all-or-not technology in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) requires the buyer to acquire either all available information or nothing at all, making her information choice too rigid to match the variety of potential securities, thus fails to re…ne the in…nitely many quasi-debts. In our approach of ‡exible information acquisition, however, the variety of available information structures matches that of potential securities to be designed and hence a sharper result can be achieved. Especially, by reshaping the uneven tail of a quasi-debt as ‡at as possible, the information cost to the buyer can be saved and the potential loss of trading due to adverse selection mitigated. The resulting surplus could make both parties better o¤ and thus ultimately permit greater provision of liquidity.
The uniqueness result is not only a theoretical contribution but also a signi…cant empirical success as it pertains to the prevalence of debt, rather than quasi-debts, in various …nance settings, so that it worths a deeper understanding. Fundamentally, the uniqueness of the optimal contract in our paper does not derive from ‡exible information acquisition alone, but from the combination of ‡exible information acquisition and the inherent ‡exibility of security design. We call this feature symmetric ‡exibility. In principle, general ‡exibility of choice, not necessarily restricted to information acquisition alone, enables an economic agent to make state-contingent responses. In other words, the agent can make one best response in one state, another best response in another state. Symmetric ‡exibility requires that both parties are endowed with the same level of ‡exibility.
How this symmetric ‡exibility works can be seen by comparing our framework with that of Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) and the traditional models of costly state veri…cation (CSV) à la Townsend (1979) . In all three, the contract designer is endowed with ‡exibility; that is, she can assign statecontingent repayment by designing any form of security. What matters in shaping the di¤erent results on uniqueness of the optimal contract is the potential ‡exibility of the other party, who decides whether or not to accept the o¤er. In our framework, ex-ante symmetric information (in the form of two-sided ignorance) prevents the buyer from making a state-contingent choice via the traditional CSV approach to information acquisition. But in our framework the buyer can choose the state-contingent probability of accepting the o¤er by acquiring information ‡exibly. In this sense, the buyer enjoys as much ‡exibil-ity as the seller. This symmetry of ‡exibility guarantees the uniqueness of the optimal contract, which is the standard debt. In Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , however, the buyer can only take the traditional CSV approach, which o¤ers only two options, namely, acquiring all the information existing or none at all. In other words, the buyer in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) cannot make state-contingent decisions. Hence, the desired symmetry of ‡exibility fails, and so, therefore, does the uniqueness of the optimal contract. Interestingly, Townsend (1979) also employs the CSV approach with two options to model information acquisition (to audit or not), but the unique optimality of a standard debt still emerges. Why is this the case? Unlike Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) and our framework, Townsend (1979) gives the entrepreneur an informational advantage, in the sense that the entrepreneur, unlike the lender, knows the true state (the pro…t that the project will yield). Thanks to the revelation principle, the lender can decide whether to audit or not in any state, based on the truth told by the entrepreneur. In other words, although in Townsend (1979) the lender still only has two options to acquire information, like the buyer in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , the choice can nevertheless be state-contingent. Therefore, the symmetry of ‡exibility is still established in Townsend (1979) , and the uniqueness of the optimal contract, also a standard debt, is ensured as well.
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There are two essential factors in the optimality of standard debt. One is the …xed aggregate cash ‡ow implicitly speci…ed in the benchmark trading game 3 , in the sense that the aggregate cash ‡ow of seller and buyer is invariant with respect to the success or failure of the transaction. This situation resembles an exchange economy where the two parties trade to share the cash ‡ow generated by some asset in place but cannot change the aggregate cash ‡ow. This produces con ‡icting interests between the two parties, so that the buyer gains by acquiring information but at the expense of the seller through adverse selection which further reduces the potential gain from trading. Since the buyer's incentive to acquire information is shaped by the o¤er, the seller deliberately designs the ABS to discourage information acquisition harmful to her own interests. Hence standard debt is optimal as it is the least information sensitive security. Absent this feature of …xed aggregate cash ‡ow, Yang and Zeng (2012) consider a production economy without an asset in place, showing that information acquisition could increase social welfare and the interests of the two parties could be partly aligned. As a result, non-debt-like contracts may be optimal to encourage certain type of information acquisition that leads to more e¢ cient investment decisions.
Another key factor is homogeneity in information acquisition. That is, no state is characterized by special di¢ culty in information acquisition. This feature stems from rational inattention; it is the reason why our qualitative result does not depend on the distribution of the fundamental states. Intuitively, if information about some states is much easier to acquire, the ‡at tail of the debt cannot be preserved in the optimal ABS. We provide an example to illustrate this idea.
Finally, debt is safe and thus optimal when it is traded alone. Farhi and Tirole (2012) also examine the optimality of debt/tranching from the perspective of information acquisition. Issuing debt may not be optimal when the buyer can purchase the residual cash ‡ow as well, as bundling the tranches destroys the information insensitiveness of debt. Farhi and Tirole (2012) clearly disentangle di¤erent e¤ects of selling a safe tranche on information acquisition, but tranching is directly assumed and the focus is not security design.
We proceed as follows. Section introduces ‡exible information acquisition in a binary choice problem, which provides a solid foundation for analyzing players' behavior in the trading game and liquidity provision. Subsection 2.3 derives the unique optimality of debt in various circumstances and identi…es two key driving forces for this result. We conclude and discuss in Section 6.
Relation to the Literature. We model players'information acquisition in the rational inattention framework building on Sims (1998) and Sims (2003) . 4 In applied work, rational inattention is studied mainly in two cases: linearquadratic (e.g., Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009)) , and binary-action. A good example of the latter is Woodford (2009) , where a representative …rm acquires information and then decides whether to revise the price. Like Yang (2013) , this paper adopts the binary-action setup in a strategic framework, which differs from the single-person decision problem studied in Woodford (2009) and past rational inattention literature. Compared with Yang (2013) , where both players acquire information and move simultaneously, here we posit that players move sequentially and focus on the strategic interaction between information acquisition and security design. Together with Yang (2013) , this paper is one of the …rst to incorporate rational inattention-based ‡exible information acquisition into strategic situations. It o¤ers a number of new results. This paper is also closely related to the security design literature, in much of which sellers are modeled as "insiders"with private information. Their information advantage over buyers results in adverse selection, hence ine¢ cient trading. To overcome adverse selection, given that buyers cannot acquire information, sellers want to signal their private information and so partly restore e¢ cient trading. In this process, appropriate security design is crucial. This is because signaling is costly, so designing a security that is less information-sensitive than the original asset can save the signaling cost, thus increasing sellers'pro…t. This argument is plausible, and insightful results are well established in the literature, but other interesting possibilities are worth investigating. Further, this literature imposes various assumptions in order to deliver its results. In our model, buyers may actively acquire information, which could alter the interplay between the two parties and produce di¤erent results on security design; and we can get clearer results from a single assumption.
The fundamental di¤erence with much of the security design literature emerges clearly if we examine some of their assumptions and results in detail. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) show that splitting assets into debt and equity mitigates the "lemon" problem between outsiders and insiders. They do not consider a security design problem but instead directly assume the existence of debt. In DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), informed sellers signal the quality of assets to competitive liquidity suppliers by retaining part of the cash ‡ows. Equity is issued when the contractible information is not particularly sensitive to sellers'inside knowledge. If the information structure allows a uniform worst case, standard debt is optimal within the set of non-decreasing securities. Biais and Mariotti (2005) study the e¤ects of market power on liquidity. They derive both the optimal security and the trading mechanism through mechanism design. The debt contract turns out to be optimal under the distributional conditions of the underlying cash ‡ows. DeMarzo (2005) focuses on the consequences of pooling and tranching. Pooling has an information destruction e¤ect, which destroys the seller's ability to signal the quality of the assets separately. When tranching is possible, pooling may also have a risk diversi…cation e¤ect, reducing information sensitivity of the senior tranche. Under certain distributional assumptions of the noise structure, DeMarzo (2005) shows that as the number of underlying assets goes to in…nity the risk diversi…cation e¤ect dominates the information destruction e¤ect. In this limiting case, pooling and tranching become optimal. These models also restrict their attention to non-decreasing securities 5 . Innes (1990) provides a standard motivation for this constraint. When the security is not monotone, a seller may cheat by borrowing from a third party, reporting a large cash ‡ow to reduce the repayment and then repaying the side loan. The validity of this argument depends on the context. In the case of publicly traded stocks or bonds, such fraud is improbable: it is di¢ cult or even illegal for the seller to manipulate the cash ‡ows. Moreover, when the security is written on multiple underlying assets, the concept of monotonicity itself is poorly de…ned. Our framework does not su¤er from these limits. Last, some recent works on the relationship between security design and market liquidity, such as Chemla and Hennessy (2011) and Pagano and Volpin (2012) , argue that the design of di¤erent securities is closely related to liquidity in the primary market, the secondary market, or both, and that this relationship depends crucially on market participants'information. These works rely on issuers'ex-ante information advantages while our model focuses on endogenous adverse selection caused by information acquisition.
It is also interesting to contrast our work with Axelson (2007) . Unlike the signaling literature on security design such as DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and subsequent works, Axelson (2007) considers a security design problem in which the buyer, not the seller, has private information about the asset. Axelson's benchmark model could be placed in our framework as the case of variable aggregate cash ‡ow, with the seller designing contract and the buyer having information advantage, so that it is natural to expect equity rather than debt to be a better solution to the seller's …nancing problem. Our framework di¤ers more deeply from Axelson (2007) in that we take the buyer's private information as endogenous, a consequence of ‡exible information acquisition. Further, as noted above, our results are more general in that they are not restricted to the case where the buyer gets private information, but only require that one party designs the contract and the other acquires information.
From a partially related angle, Christopher Hennessy (Hennessy (2009) and Hennessy (2011) ) considers the interaction between information acquisition and market microstructure. Speci…cally, following the noisy rational expectation framework, he simultaneously considers two information channels: endogenous acquisition by speculators and market price. When speculators account for most of the market, riskless debt proves to be the optimal security, as it mitigates speculators'incentive for information acquisition and thus endogenous adverse selection, which …ts with the present paper. By contrast, when noise traders' liquidity demand is high, risky debt becomes optimal, since its issuance exploits the information role of market price when endogenous information acquisition is less important.
The Benchmark Model
We present our benchmark model of liquidity provision, focusing on the interaction between security design and information acquisition. This model does not aim to capture every aspect of liquidity provision, like risk sharing, market competition, or reselling. Instead, we make assumptions to highlight the ‡exible nature of information acquisition and its e¤ects on optimal security design.
We consider a two-period game with two players. One is a seller who is endowed with an asset at period 0. This asset generates a veri…able random cash ‡ow 2 = R + in period 1 6 . The other player is a potential buyer 7 holding consumption goods (money) at period 0. Following the convention of the security design literature, we assume that both players are risk-neutral. Speci…cally, player i's utility function is given by
where c it denotes player i's consumption at period t and i 2 [0; 1] is her subjective discount factor, i 2 fs; bg(fs; bg stands for fseller; buyerg). We assume b > s , i.e. we posit that the seller has a better investment opportunity than 6 Here the assumption of veri…able cash ‡ows is natural, since we generally have third parties monitor and collect the underlying loans and distribute the cash ‡ows to the holders of asset backed securities.
7 Alternatively, we can reinterpret this single-buyer as a continuum of buyers without changing our main results. This will be made clear after we setup information acquisition. the buyer 8 . This assumption creates the trading demand. Both parties may bene…t from transferring some goods to the seller at date 0 and compensating the buyer with repayment backed by the random cash ‡ow at date 1.
Like Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , we assume no information asymmetry at period 0 to focus on the adverse selection resulted from information acquisition. Hence the two agents start with identical information about , which is represented by a full support common prior P over R + . Without loss of generality, we assume that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue's measure on R + .
A security backed by , the cash ‡ow of the asset, is a mapping s :
is a security s ( ) associated with a price q > 0. Throughout this paper, we assume one player proposes a take-it-or-leave-it contract (s ( ) ; q) to the counterparty, who then acquires information and decides whether or not to accept 9 . This captures the idea that some agents in the markets for securitized assets are more sophisticated than others and can produce private information about the underlying cash ‡ows. This separation between bargaining power and the ability to acquire information also makes our problem tractable.
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In the benchmark model, we focus on the case in which the seller designs the contract and the buyer acquires information. We then highlight two factors driving the optimality of issuing debt. Finally, we show that debt remains uniquely optimal when the roles of the buyer and the seller are reversed (i.e., the buyer proposes the contract and the seller acquires information).
Our benchmark model can be naturally generalized to accommodate multiple assets, i.e., = R We prove all the results for the general setup 11 , but employ the benchmark model to convey our main theme through out the body of the paper. 8 Another interpretation is that the seller has a higher carrying cost than the buyer, as in Hennessy (2012) . 9 The assumption of take-it-or-leave-it o¤er and the resulted binary decision (buy either all or nothing) is not as restrictive as it seems. If the agent is allowed to choose the amount to purchase, she will still choose to buy all or nothing since she is risk-neutral. This point will be made clear in Subsection 2.1. 1 0 If the issuer could produce private information before making the proposal, the signaling game would be much more complicated. The set of possible signals would consist in all contracts, which is a functional space. To the best of our knowledge, this kind of signaling game has been studied only rarely. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) do consider a security design problem in which potential signals are securities, but their approach does not …t our framework of ‡exible information acquisition. In the literature, either the informed agent chooses …nite-dimension signals (e.g., the level of debt in Ross (1977) , or the fraction of equity retained in Leland and Pyle (1977) , etc.), or else the issuer designs the security before obtaining information (e.g., DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), Biais and Mariotti (2005) ).
1 1 In this general setup, a debt security with face value D is given by s ! = min P N n=1 n; D . Debt is again uniquely optimal in this general setup, as proved in Appendix A.
Information Acquisition
As described above, the seller and the buyer play a sequential-move game. The seller moves …rst to design the contract, then the buyer acquires information about the fundamental state according to her (state-contingent) payo¤ that is determined by the contract. We solve this game with backward induction. We …rst study the buyer's information acquisition problem with any given contract in this subsection. We then analyze the seller's security design problem in the next two subsections.
The starting point of our analysis is that di¤erent securities provide di¤erent incentives to acquire information about di¤erent aspects of the fundamental, as illustrated by the following example. Figure 2.1.1 shows the payment from holding a debt security. The payment is constant for the fundamental states above the face value but becomes state-contingent otherwise. As a result, the buyer has an incentive to acquire information about the bad states rather than the good states when facing a debt security. This is consistent with the well known fact that debt holders mainly care about the default risk. In contrast, when facing a leveraged equity, the buyer wants to pay more attention to good states where her payo¤ becomes state-contingent, as shown in Figure 2 .1.2. Facing various securities, the buyer tends to allocate attention in di¤erent aspects of the underlying cash ‡ow when acquiring information. As the seller is able to design a security ‡exibly that leads to ‡exible incentives, it calls for a su¢ ciently ‡exible characterization to capture the potential variety of attention allocation by the buyer.
We employ the approach of "rational inattention" in Sims (1998) , Sims (2003) and Sims (2005) to capture the buyer's ‡exible incentive in acquiring information. The buyer can acquire information by arranging to receive a signal, which maybe related in a fairly arbitrary way to fundamental . Speci…cally, the signal x is drawn from some set X according to a conditional probability (xj ) chosen by the buyer, whose decision about whether to purchase the security is then a function of the signal x that is received. Receiving this signal costs I (in terms of utility) to the buyer, where I is the measure of the average information content of the signal according to Shannon (1948) , namely the average amount by which the entropy of the posterior distribution over after observing signal x is less than the entropy of the prior. Here the entropy measures the uncertainty indicated by a probability distribution. Speci…cally, the entropy of any density p over R is given by
where the expectation is taken under density p. The parameter > 0 controls the di¢ culty in acquiring information. A higher value of requires the buyer to economize on information acquisition to a greater extent.
In principle, the buyer can choose to purchase any fraction a 2 [0; 1] of the proposed security after acquiring information. Let a (x) denote the optimal fraction upon receiving signal x. Since the buyer is risk-neutral, a (x) 2 (0; 1) implies that she is indi¤erent between purchasing or not when receiving x. As an elementary result in "rational inattention", however, it is not optimal for the buyer to expand any e¤ort to acquire such a useless signal that makes her decision irrelevant. Hence, our assumption of binary decision (a (x) 2 f0; 1g) is not as restrictive as it seems, and the buyer's information acquisition is greatly simpli…ed to a binary decision problem with rational inattention as in and Woodford (2009) . Although employing the same mathematical technique, our model has a focus completely di¤erent from these two papers. We study how information acquisition is determined by and in turn determines the payo¤ structures in a multi-agent setting, while and Woodford (2009) focus on the implied irrationality of a representative agent and the resulted rigidity-related phenomena. This feature of strategic interaction involving information acquisition also di¤erentiates our model from past macroeconomic literature employing rational inattention.
Another elementary result in "rational inattention" is that under the optimal information structure, the number of values that signal x will take cannot exceeds the number of the decisionmaker's possible actions (Caplin and Dean (2012) ). Hence in our binary decision context, signal x will take two possible values, denoted by f1; 0g, interpreted as a "yes/no" signal as to whether fundamental is good enough to accept the contract.
12 Since the only use of the signal is to make a binary decision, a signal that di¤erentiates more …nely among the states just conveys redundant information and thus costs the agent's more attention without improving the quality of decision. This gives rise to the optimality of a binary signal. Moreover, the buyer's optimal decision should be a deterministic function of signal x, i.e., accepting the contract if and only if the signal is "yes" (x = 1), since it is never optimal to waste her scarce attention to acquire a signal that just makes her indi¤erent. Consequently, like Woodford (2008) and Woodford (2009) , it is su¢ cient to focus on informationally e¢ cient strategies de…ned by the above features 13 , and any such strategy can be characterized by a hazard function m : R + ! [0; 1], where m ( ) = Pr (accepting j state is ) .
Note that the corresponding information structure is given by (x = 1 j ) = m ( ) and (x = 0 j ) = 1 m ( ). With a slight abuse of notation but without confusion, we also call m the information structure. Now we are ready to formalize the buyer's information acquisition. The buyer 14 acquires information by choosing an information structure m. To make it rigorous, we require that m belongs to
Following the rational inattention literature, choosing m incurs an information cost
where
and
Here the expectation operator E( ) is with respect to under prior P , I (m) measures the information content of the signal, and > 0 is a parameter that controls the di¢ culty in acquiring information. An intuitive way to understand I (m) is that it measures the variability of function m, the informativeness of the signal with respect to the state. For example, when m ( ) is constant, the signal conveys no information about and I (m) = 0. This is because function g is strictly convex, hence I (m) is zero if and only if m ( ) is constant. A nice property of our technology of information acquisition, therefore, is that there exists information acquisition if and only if m ( ) varies over , if and only if the information cost is positive. Also note that the "shape" (functional form) of m determines not only the quantity but also the qualitative nature of information. For instance, the buyer can concentrate her attention to some event (i.e., a subset of R + ) by making m ( ) highly sensitive to within the event. In this sense our technology of information acquisition is ‡exible, since the agent can decide the pointwise quality of their information by choosing any information structure from M . Note further that c ( ) is convex, i.e., c (t
for all m 1 ; m 2 2 M and t 2 [0; 1]. This convexity is strict when at least one of m 1 and m 2 is not constant in .
The Buyer' s Decision Problem
Let (s; q) be an arbitrary contract. Then the buyer's payo¤ gain from accepting over rejecting this contract is
which determines her incentive in acquiring information. Speci…cally, the buyer's decision problem is
where the expectation operator E( ) is with respect to under prior P . Lemma 2 of provides a solution to this problem. Here we adapt it to our context and provide a self-contained proof in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 15 Let Pr ( u ( ) 6 = 0) > 0 to exclude the trivial case that the buyer is always indi¤ erent between action 1 and 0 (i.e., accepting or rejecting the contract). Let m 2 M be an optimal strategy and p 1 = Em ( ) be the corresponding unconditional probability of taking action 1. Then, i) the optimal strategy is unique; ii) there are three possibilities for the optimal strategy: a) p 1 = 1 (i.e., m ( ) = 1 almost surely) if and only if
b) p 1 = 0 (i.e., m ( ) = 0 almost surely) if and only if
1 5 We do not have to require R. This proposition holds for any probability space . c) p 1 2 (0; 1) if and only if
in this case, the optimal strategy m is characterized by
for all 2 , where
Proof. See Appendix A. Proposition 1 fully characterizes the buyer's possible optimal decisions on information acquisition. Case a) and Case b) correspond to a scenario of an extreme prior, in the sense that there exists an ex-ante optimal action, 1 or 0. These two cases do not involve information acquisition and thus also correspond to the scenario in which information acquisition is su¢ ciently costly. Case c), the more interesting one, does involve information acquisition. Speci…cally, the optimal decision rule m( ) is not constant, and neither action 1 nor action 0 is ex-ante optimal. Intuitively, this corresponds to the scenario where the prior is not extreme, or the cost of information acquisition is su¢ ciently low. In case c), where information acquisition is involved in the optimal decision rule, the agent equates the marginal bene…t of information with its marginal cost. In doing so, the agent chooses the "shape" of the optimal information structure m( ) according to the "shape"of the payo¤ gain u( ) and her prior P , which process is consistent with the essence of ‡exible information acquisition.
Before proceeding to the security design problem, let us gain some intuition through two numerical examples to see how the approach of ‡exible information acquisition works. Since the payo¤ gain b s ( ) q increases in , so does the optimal strategy m ( ). That is, the buyer arranges to receive a signal that is more likely to suggest accepting the contract at states with relatively higher payo¤s, which is intuitive. Especially, m ( ) is constant across the states with the same payo¤, meaning that no attention is spent in di¤erentiating these states. More generally, since the buyer's action is more sensitive to where slope
re ‡ects her attentiveness around . Figure 2. 2.3 plots
to illustrate the buyer's attention allocation. We see that the buyer intensively acquires information for the bad states but is rationally inattentive to tail states. This is consistent with the well known fact that debt holders mainly care about the default risk. These examples clearly show how ‡exible the incentive to acquire information could be, and how it can be captured by our framework of ‡exible information acquisition.
Security Design under Flexible Information Acquisition
We have clearly characterized the buyer's information acquisition against general securities. In this subsection, we study the seller's security design problem. For any contract (s; q), let m s;q 2 M denote the buyer's (unique) optimal strategy speci…ed by Proposition 1, i.e., m s;q ( ) is the probability that the buyer accepts (s; q) at state . Then the seller's expected payo¤ from proposing (s; q)
where the expectation operator E( ) is with respect to under common prior P . The seller needs to choose a contract (s; q) to maximize W (s; q). To streamline the analysis, we formally de…ne the equilibrium of this model as follows.
De…nition 2 The sequential equilibrium is de…ned as a collection of the seller's optimal contract (s ; q ), and m s;q , the buyer's optimal information acquisition strategy for any generic contract (s; q), such that i). m s;q is determined by Proposition 1, i.e.,
By Proposition 1, there are three possible cases pertaining to the buyer's behavior, given the seller's optimal contract. First, the buyer may optimally choose not to acquire any information and accept the seller's contract directly. Second, the buyer may optimally acquire some information induced by the seller's optimal contract, and then accept with positive probability (but less than one). Third, the buyer may simply reject the contract without acquiring information. This corresponds to the seller's outside option of proposing nothing and so raising no liquidity. Hence, there is no need to consider the seller's individual rationality condition.
In what follows, we …rst show that in equilibrium this last case does not occur, since both seller and buyer should have gained from the trade. Then we characterize the seller's optimal contract for the …rst two types of equilibrium.
Let p s;q denote the buyer's unconditional probability of accepting contract (s; q), then p s;q = Em s;q ( ) . Proposition 3 p s ;q > 0, i.e., trade happens with positive probability.
Proof. See Appendix A. The key to the proof is to show that the seller always has a positive expected payo¤ by proposing a debt security. Hence her optimal contract too necessarily generates a positive expected payo¤, which can be achieved only through a successful trade. Despite adverse selection, the seller always prefers trade, because she holds all the bargaining power, and can minimize the adverse e¤ect of information acquisition by designing the right contract and thus obtaining the gains from trade.
According to Proposition 3, we only need to consider case i): p s ;q = 1, in which the buyer does not acquire information; and case ii): p s ;q 2 (0; 1), in which the buyer does acquire information. We …rst study the seller's optimal contract in case i).
Optimal Contract without Inducing Information Acquisition
In this subsection, we consider the case in which the seller's optimal contract is simply accepted by the buyer without information acquisition. Concretely, this means Pr(m s;q ( ) = 1) = 1. We …rst consider the buyer's information acquisition problem, given the seller's contract. Then we characterize the seller's optimal contract.
By Proposition 1 and condition (4), any contract (s; q) that is accepted by the buyer without information acquisition must satisfy
In particular, if the left hand side of the inequality is strictly less than one, the seller could always raise price q in order to increase the expected payo¤, leaving the buyer's response unchanged. Hence, in equilibrium this inequality must bind, i.e.,
Since the contract is always accepted, the seller's expected payo¤ becomes
Hence the seller's problem can be formalized as 
Proposition 4 If the seller's optimal contract (s ; q ) induces the buyer to accept it without acquiring information, it must be a debt security
with price q , where the face value is determined by
and q > 0 is the unique …xed point of
Proof. See Appendix A. Debt is the unique optimal contract. The intuition here is clear. We are looking at the asset-backed securities that make the buyer break even between acquiring and not acquiring information. Thanks to ‡exible information acquisition, any mean-preserving spread of the optimal security would induce the buyer to acquire information. In other words, debt is the least information-sensitive security that gives the seller the desired expected payo¤. More speci…cally, it is the ‡at tail of debt that reduces the buyer's incentive to acquire information. As a result, a debt security is the seller's unique optimal choice.
We can also see this point from another angle. We can show that the seller's optimal contract, as a debt characterized by Proposition 4, second order stochastic dominates any other asset-backed securities with the same expected payo¤. That said, for all possible asset-backed securities that make the buyer indi¤erent between acquiring and not acquiring information, debt delivers the highest expected payo¤ to the seller. This is exactly the logic underlying the seller's optimization problem. The face value of the debt is determined in such a way that it delivers the greatest expected payo¤, without inducing the buyer to acquire information.
An interesting observation is implied by equation (9), i.e.,
which follows Jensen's inequality. Since the o¤er induces no information acquisition, both parties remain symmetrically informed and theoretically the seller should have charged b Es ( ). Actually, however, the seller …nds it optimal to charge a lower price q so as to "bribe" the buyer not to acquire information.
Optimal Contract with Information Acquisition
Now we characterize the optimal contract for the seller that does induce the buyer to acquire information and accept the contract with positive probability (but less than one). Concretely, this means Pr(m s;q ( ) 2 (0; 1)) = 1 .
Again, according to Proposition 1, any contract (s; q) that induces the buyer to acquire information must satisfy
where the expectation operator E( ) is with respect to under common prior P . As noted above, when conditions (11) and (12) are satis…ed, for the buyer neither accepting nor rejecting is optimal, ex ante. So the buyer …nds it optimal to …rst acquire some information and then make the decision. In other words, in this case the proposed contract will induce information acquisition.
Given such a contract (s; q), Proposition 1 and condition (7) also prescribe that the buyer's optimal decision rule of information acquisition m s;q is characterized by
where p s;q = Em s;q ! is the buyer's unconditional probability of accepting the contract. Condition (13) concludes the buyer's decision problem, given the proposed contract (s; q). We derive the seller's optimal contract by backward induction. Taking into account of buyer's response m s;q , the seller chooses (s; q) to maximize the expected payo¤ W (s; q) = E (m s;q ( ) [q s s ( )]) subject to (11), (12) 16 , (13) and the limited liability constraint
We derive the seller's optimal contract (s ; q ) through the variational approach. Speci…cally, we characterize how the seller's expected payo¤ responds to the perturbation of the optimal security s .
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Let s ( ) = s ( ) + " ( ) be an arbitrary perturbation of s . Note that the buyer's optimal decision rule m s;q appears in the seller's expected payo¤ W (s; q), and it is implicitly determined by the proposed security s through the functional equation (13). Hence, we need …rst characterize how m s;q varies with respect to the perturbation of s . This is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For any perturbation s ( ) = s ( ) + " ( ), the buyer's decision rule m s;q changes according to:
The …rst term of the right hand side of (15) is the buyer's local response to " ( ). It is of the same sign as the perturbation " ( ). When the repayment at state is higher, the buyer is more likely to accept the o¤er in this state. The second term measures the buyer's average response to perturbation " ( ) over all states. It is straightforward to verify that the denominator is positive, due to Jensen's inequality. As a result, if the perturbation increases the buyer's repayment on average over all states, there is also a greater likelihood of accepting the contract. Now we can calculate the variation of the seller's expected payo¤ W (s; q ), according to (8) . Taking the derivative of W (s; q ) with respect to at = 0 leads to
Substitute (15) into (16) and we get
Note that w is a constant that does not depend on and will be endogenously determined in equilibrium. Further, r ( ) is the Fréchet derivative of the seller's expected payo¤ W (s; q ) at s , which measures the marginal contribution of any perturbation to the seller's expected payo¤ when the contract is optimal. Speci…cally, the …rst term of (18) is the direct contribution of the perturbation of s ( ) disregarding the variation of m s ;q ( ); the second term measures the indirect contribution through the variation of m s ;q ( ). This Fréchet derivative r( ) plays an important role in shaping the seller's optimal contract.
To further characterize the optimal contract, we discuss the Fréchet derivative r( ) in detail. Let A 0 = f 2 : 6 = 0; s ( ) = 0g ; A 1 = f 2 : 6 = 0; s ( ) 2 (0; )g and A 2 = f 2 : 6 = 0; s ( ) = g : Clearly, fA 0 ; A 1 ; A 2 g is a partition of n f0g. Since s is the optimal security, we have dW (s; q ) d =0 0 for any feasible 18 perturbation " ( ). Hence, condition (17) implies r ( )
Since g is strictly convex, r ( ) g 00 (m s ;q ( )) is of the same sign as r ( ). Thus (19) can be rewritten as
Recall condition (13), given the optimal contract (s ; q ), the buyer's best response m s ;q ( ) is characterized by
is the buyer's unconditional probability of accepting the optimal contract (s ; q ).
Conditions (20)
19 and (21) as a system of functional equations jointly determine the optimal security s when the optimal contract induces information acquisition.
We solve the system of equations to get the seller's optimal contract s and the buyer's associated optimal decision rule of information acquisition m s ;q . Note that the values of p s ;q and w will also be endogenously determined in equilibrium. To facilitate the analysis and economize on notations, consider two equivalent equations with respect to variables m and s, in which m stands for m s ;q ( ) and s stands for s ( ).
Let m = f 1 (s) and m = f 2 (s) be the two continuous functions implicitly de…ned by (22) and (23), respectively. 1 8 A perturbation " is feasible with respect to s if 9 > 0, s.t. 8 ! 2 , s ! + " ! 2 h 0; P N n=1 n i . 1 9 One may object that Equation (20) is just the …rst order condition of the seller's optimization problem. It only characterizes the critical points. In principle, we should characterize the largest critical point, but our argument holds for any critical point, so our results are not open to this critique.
Before solving the system of equations, it will be helpful to gain some insight into the shape of the optimal security by examining a problem without the limited liability constraint, in which case, r ( ) = 0 and thus by de…nition,
holds for all 2 . Hence, without the limited liability constraint, the pair of values (m s ;q ; s ) satis…es both
Since [m g 00 (m)] 0 > 0 and g 00 (m) > 0, it is obvious that f 0 1 (s) < 0 and f 0 2 (s) > 0. Therefore, the curves m = f 1 (s) and m = f 2 (s) intersect at most once, which suggests that in the absence of the limited liability constraint, s ( ) must be a constant. This observation re ‡ects the seller's objective of minimizing the buyer's incentive to acquire information. By maintaining a constant repayment level, the seller ensures that the buyer gains nothing by distinguishing di¤erent states of the underlying cash ‡ow; thus eliminates any incentive to acquire information.
In equilibrium, however, the limited liability constraint does bind. Otherwise, the seller will always propose s ( ) = s at price q = b s , and achieve a gain ( b s ) s from trading, which can be made arbitrarily large by increasing s . Of course this contradicts the …niteness of the collateral. Proposition 6 examines the lower boundary of the limited liability constraint s ( ) 0.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium, Pr (A 0 ) = 0, where A 0 = f 2 : 6 = 0; s ( ) = 0g.
Proof. See Appendix A.
By this proposition, s ( ) never reaches its lower boundary. This re ‡ects the seller's incentive to trade. At the boundary s ( ) = 0, while raising s ( ) decreases the seller's payo¤, it increases the probability of trading even more sharply. Thus on average the seller gains by deviating from the lower boundary. As a result, leveraged equity or call options are not optimal to raise liquidity.
This analysis suggests that the optimal security s ( ) is either a constant or reaches the upper boundary of the limited liability constraint. Figure 2. 3.2 shows a typical security that satis…es these conditions. A debt contract de…nitely satis…es these conditions. Moreover, we show that the optimal security must be a debt.
Proposition 7
If the seller's optimal contract induces the buyer to acquire information, it must be a debt, i.e., s ( ) = min ( ; D ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Together with Propositions 3 and 4, Proposition 7 enables us to conclude that issuing debt is always the unique optimal way to raise liquidity.
Compared with the typical security in Figure ? ?, the unique optimality of debt securities re ‡ects the seller's incentive to minimize the buyer's information acquisition. This is achieved by maintaining a constant repayment level, which gives rise to the ‡at tail of debt. However, if the underlying cash ‡ow becomes too low to support that level, s ( ) reaches the upper boundary of the limited liability constraint and gives rise to the 45-degree-line part of debt. Therefore, the mechanism to render debt as information insensitive and thus uniquely optimal relies on the ‡at tail of debt, rather than the liability constraint. On the contrary, in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , what matters for information acquisition and thus the optimality of the securities is the liability constraint, namely, the 45 degree line. Hence, there also exist in…nitely many other securities that follow the 45 degree line in bad states but deliver fairly arbitrary ‡uctuating payo¤s in good states, called "quasi-debts", which are just as optimal as the standard debt. Those quasi-debts correspond to various nondebt-like securities in reality and may not be actually information insensitive in a common sense.
In contrast to the non-uniqueness result of Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , we show the unique optimality of debt thanks to our ‡exible information acquisition framework. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) model information acquisition through the approach of Costly State Veri…cation (CSV), which is too rigid to accommodate the ‡exible incentive in acquiring information. Speci…cally, CSV only allows the buyer to choose between two extreme information structures while in…nite forms of securities can be designed, which inevitably makes some securities indistinguishable. In our framework, with ‡ex-ibility, the variety of information structures matches that of potential securities. So the uniqueness of the standard debt can be guaranteed. Quasi-debt is no longer optimal in our model. By ‡attening the uneven tail above the price of a quasi-debt, not only can the buyer's information cost be saved but the potential loss of trade due to adverse selection can be mitigated. The resulting surplus can be used by the seller to the advantage of both parties; ultimately therefore, it permits better liquidity provision.
The security design literature usually assumes the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) or similar hypotheses on the information structure to guarantee a meaningful result. Our framework justi…es this assumption by endogenizing the information structure. By Proposition 7, the optimal security s ( ) is non-decreasing in . Proposition 1 implies that the best information structure m s ;q ( ) is increasing in the payo¤ gain b s ( ) q . Hence m s ;q ( ) is also non-decreasing in . Therefore, a larger implies a greater probability that the buyer will receive a signal to accept. This can be interpreted as a MLRP in our context.
To facilitate the analysis, the security design literature usually restricts attention to the set of "regular" securities, which are non-decreasing in the underlying cash ‡ow (e.g., DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), DeMarzo (2005)). We do not impose such a restriction, but show nevertheless that the optimal security naturally turns out to be non-decreasing. In addition, while most models in this literature depend on speci…c distributional assumptions about the cash ‡ow, our qualitative result does not.
Finally, Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) get the debt contract as uniquely optimal when their …xed information cost is zero. This can be taken as a special case of our model in which , the marginal cost of information acquisition, becomes nil. Another special case worth noting is ! 1, in which the seller can sell any security without inducing information acquisition. So selling the whole asset, i.e., s ( ) = , is uniquely optimal. This corresponds to the debt security with face value above the highest possible cash ‡ow.
Understanding the Origin of Uniqueness
For readers familiar with CSV, a natural question regards the uniqueness of the optimal contract. Both Townsend (1979) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) employ CSV. Why, then, does the former but not the latter get debt as uniquely optimal? In the previous argument, we attributed the non-uniqueness in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) to the rigidity of CSV. This argument is correct when the comparison is with our model, but not fully convincing when Townsend (1979) is also considered. To analyze the di¤erent results in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , Townsend (1979) and our own model, let us …rst highlight the essence of ‡exibility. In principle, general ‡exible choice (not necessarily restricted to information acquisition alone) enables an economic agent to make state-contingent responses. In other words, the agent can make one best response in one state, another best response in another state. In all three of the models under consideration, the security designer has ‡exibility, in that she can assign state-contingent repayment by designing any form of security. What matters in shaping the di¤erent results on uniqueness is the potential ‡exibility of the other party. By comparing these three models, we can see that the origin of the uniqueness lies not only in ‡exibility as such, but in symmetric ‡exibility. Here, symmetric ‡exibility requires that both parties to a potential trade have the same level of ‡exibility.
In our framework, ex-ante symmetric information (in the form of two-sided ignorance) prevents the buyer from making a state-contingent choice if she follows the CSV approach. But in our framework the buyer can choose the statecontingent probability (i.e., m ( )) of accepting the o¤er; that is, she can engage in ‡exible information acquisition. In this sense the buyer has as much ‡exibility as the seller. Given this symmetry of ‡exibility, the uniqueness of the optimal contract is guaranteed. In Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , by contrast, the buyer can only take the conventional CSV approach to information acquisition with only two options, namely, acquiring a signal or not. Moreover, ex-ante two-sided ignorance precludes conditioning the buyer's action on any private information the seller may have. Hence in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) the CSV keeps the buyer from making state-contingent decisions. The desired symmetric ‡exibility therefore fails, and so, as a consequence does the uniqueness of the optimal contract. Interestingly, Townsend (1979) also uses the CSV approach with two options to model information acquisition (to audit or not), but the unique optimality of the standard debt contract still emerges. Why is this the case? Unlike Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) and our framework, Townsend (1979) gives the entrepreneur an information advantage over the lender, in that the former knows the realized pro…t of the project. Thanks to the revelation principle, the lender who acquires information in the interim stage can decide whether to audit or not in any state, based on the truth told by the entrepreneur. In other words, although the lender in Townsend (1979) still only has two information acquisition options, like the buyer in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) , the two options are state-contingent in Townsend (1979) but not in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) . Therefore, the symmetry of ‡exibility is still established in Townsend (1979) , and the uniqueness of the optimal contract is ensured as well. Figure 3 shows the relation among these three models. (2011) and Townsend (1979) 
Two Main Factors Driving the Optimality of Debt
This section discusses two main factors that drive our results. We show that in their absence issuing debt may not be optimal. The …rst feature of our model is …xed aggregate cash ‡ow. Before designing the contract, the seller already owns asset . Hence the aggregate cash ‡ow owned by seller and buyer is invariant with respect to the success or failure of the transaction. This …xed aggregate cash ‡ow produces con ‡icting interests between the two parties: the buyer gains by any information acquisition, but at the expense of the seller through adverse selection. That is, the buyer tries to get information that can enable her to reject o¤ers when the repayment is lower than the price and accept when it is higher. But any particular quantity or quality of information does not a¤ect the aggregate cash ‡ow.
The importance of this factor can be seen clearly in our derivation of the optimal security. The buyer's incentive to acquire information and the seller's incentive to design the security are totally shaped by their payo¤ gains from the success over the failure of the trade. Conditional on , the buyer's and seller's payo¤ gains are b s ( ) q and q s s ( ) , respectively. Neither of these depends explicitly on . The future cash ‡ows can a¤ect incentives only through the security s ( ). This is why we can de…ne the functions m = f 1 (s) and m = f 2 (s) rather than m = f 1 (s; ) or m = f 2 (s; ) in (22) and (23). The simple shape of debt follows from this independence of f 1 and f 2 on .
To classify this point, we consider a similar problem with variable aggregate cash ‡ow. The seller is an entrepreneur who wants to raise capital k for a project that generates future cash ‡ow . As before, the entrepreneur designs a security s ( ) and proposes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (s; k) to an investor, equivalent to the buyer who acquires information. The entrepreneur's project gets funded and generates future cash ‡ow only if the investor accepts the o¤er. Hence, the aggregate cash ‡ow depends on whether the transaction succeeds or not. In this case, the buyer's payo¤ gain remains unchanged but the seller's becomes
which depends explicitly on . As a result, we have m = f 1 (s; ) rather than m = f 1 (s), and the debt contract, which has a ‡at tail, may not be optimal. Unlike the case of …xed aggregate cash ‡ow, even if s ( ) is o¤ the boundaries of the limited liability constraint, the entrepreneur chooses to vary s ( ) in order to induce the investor to acquire some information. Since aggregate cash ‡ow is variable, a certain type of information acquisition bene…ts the entrepreneur and the investor taken together. It helps screen out bad projects, those with low cash ‡ows.
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The second factor that drives our results is homogeneous information acquisition. That is, no state is more di¢ cult than others in terms of information acquisition. This property, which follows the approach of rational inattention, gives rise to the independence of our qualitative results from the distributional assumptions of the cash ‡ow. Recalling the binary decision problem in Subsection 2.2, the decision maker's optimal strategy m is characterized by equation (7) u
The right hand side of equation (7) is the Fréchet derivative 21 of information cost. It does not depend explicitly on . This is the homogeneity we referred 2 0 In fact, this is a story of venture …nance. Besides raising capital, the security design also serves to elicit information from the investors (venture capitalists), who are often more knowledgeable about the venture's market prospects. A working paper of the author (Yang and Zeng (2012) ) addresses this problem in a variable aggregate cash ‡ow framework and shows that the two parties'incentives can be aligned rather than con ‡icting if securities such as convertible preferred stock and convertible debt are adopted. 2 1 For the readers not familiar with this concept, the Frechet derivative can be thought of as the gradient of the cost function.
to. As an example, homogeneity fails if we replace the term
for some non-constant function z ( ). In this case, we should de…ne m = f 2 (s; ) instead of m = f 2 (s) in (23). This dependence re ‡ects the buyer's varying di¢ culty in discerning di¤erent states. Hence the optimal contract, unlike debt, may not have a ‡at tail. For further insight, we present an example with non-homogeneous information cost. Speci…cally, let 2 [0; 1] and
for some a 2 (0; 1). Under this information cost, the state is directly observable for 2 (a; 1], while for 2 [0; a] the information can be acquired at marginal cost
.
Let b = 1 and the seller's optimal contract be (s; q). Given this contract, the buyer's optimal strategy m ( ) is characterized by 
For 2 (a; 1], the buyer accepts the o¤er if and only if s ( ) q 0, so we must have
However, information remains costly in region [0; a], so by our previous argument a debt contract is optimal within this region. Finally (see Figure 4) , the optimal contract on interval [0; 1] is no longer a debt security. 
The Distribution of Bargaining Power
This section shows that our results are not a¤ected by the distribution of bargaining power between seller and buyer. We switch their roles, positing that the buyer proposes the contract and the seller acquires information and makes the decision. We specify the environment and summarize the results in three propositions. Most of the proofs are analogous to those in our benchmark model, and can accordingly be omitted here. Suppose the buyer proposes the contract (s; q) and the seller ‡exibly acquires information. Write m s;q for the seller's optimal strategy. The uninformed buyer thus enjoys expected payo¤
The buyer's problem is to design a contract (s; q) satisfying s ( ) 2 [0; ] to maximize W (s; q). Let (s ; q ) denote the optimal contract for the buyer and p s ;q = Em s ;q ! be the corresponding probability of the trade taking place.
Proposition 8 p s ;q > 0, i.e., trade occurs with positive probability.
Proposition 9
If the buyer's optimal contract induces the seller to always accept it without acquiring information, it must be a debt security
with price q , where
and q is the unique …xed point of
Proof. The proof is practically identical to that of Proposition 4.
Proposition 10 If the buyer's optimal contract induces the seller to acquire information, it must be a debt security s ( ) = min ( ; D ).
Proof. The proof is practically identical to that of Proposition 7.
Propositions 4, 7, 9 and 10 show that issuing a debt is always optimal, no matter which party designs the contract and which acquires information. 22 In the light of our previous analysis, this result is intuitive. Switching the roles of buyer and seller does not alter either the aggregate cash ‡ow or the homogeneity of information acquisition cost.
Conclusions and Discussion
This paper studies security design through its interaction with information acquisition. An impatient seller designs an asset backed security and a buyer decides whether to buy it to provide liquidity. The buyer naturally has incentives to acquire qualitatively di¤erent information when facing di¤erent securities, which in turn a¤ects security design. This interaction, by its nature, is very ‡exible and can be captured by neither models with exogenous information asymmetry nor that with traditional approach to information acquisition like CSV. The framework of ‡exible information acquisition is introduced to accommodate such interaction, with which issuing debt is shown to be uniquely optimal. Compared with the security design literature, our results are clearer. We neither restrict coverage to non-decreasing securities nor impose various distributional assumptions on the underlying cash ‡ow or information structures, such as MLRP. Instead, these properties of the optimal security are justi…ed in equilibrium.
The de…ning feature of the optimal security in our model is the ‡at tail, which suggests a mechanism (regarding the optimality of debt) completely different from that of Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) . The buyer bene…ts from acquiring information at the expense of the seller through adverse selection. Thus the seller tries to maintain a constant payment level to minimize the buyer's incentive of information acquisition, which leads to the ‡at tail of debt. Once the state is too bad to support such level, the liability constraint binds and gives rise to the 45-degree-line part of debt. Thanks to the approach of ‡exible information acquisition, we can get rid of the quasi-debts in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2010) and achieve the uniqueness. This result is not only a theoretical contribution but also a signi…cant empirical success as it pertains to the prevalence of debt, rather than quasi-debts. We also deepen our understanding of this result through a new concept "symmetric ‡exibility". Finally, we highlight two driving factors: …xed aggregate cash ‡ow and homogeneous information cost, without which the debt may not be optimal.
The role of …xed aggregate cash ‡ow sheds light on a general classi…cation of information, namely, determining what information is socially valuable and what is not. In particular, ‡exibility enables economic agents to acquire these two types of information separately, which generates di¤erent welfare implications. At the level of the society, acquisition of information that is not socially valuable not only wastes social resources but also produces endogenous adverse selection, reducing social welfare; hence, the proper organizational form of the society should deter the acquisition of such information. The acquisition of socially valuable information, however, increases social welfare and thus should be encouraged. Our main model with …xed aggregate cash ‡ow resembles an exchange economy in which none of the information is socially valuable, so that debt is optimal because it deters information acquisition better than other contract types. On the other hand, our example with variable aggregate cash ‡ow resembles a production economy in which some information is socially valuable, as it helps prevent investing in bad states. Consequently, the acquisition of this information should be encouraged, so that debt may not always be the optimal contract. This classi…cation of information also provides a new perspective on coexistence of debt and equity, the main forms of …nancing contracts. For start-ups and high cash ‡ow projects, equity-like securities could be more desirable, in that it encourages the acquisition of socially valuable information, which helps to screen projects and control the social aggregate cash ‡ow.
23 For mature corporations with robust growth, however, whose priority is liquidity, debt could be better, as it deters unnecessary acquisition of information that is not socially valuable. This consideration jibes in part with the pecking-order theory, and future work may further unify the life-cycle evolution of capital structure of corporations with a theory of ‡exible information acquisition.
In an analogous way, positing ‡exible information acquisition can be helpful in revisiting the literature on the endogenous determination of capital structure, by specializing information acquisition. Given ‡exibility, agents who monitor may have di¤erent incentives to acquire qualitatively di¤erent information when facing di¤erent forms of …nancial contracts. Hence in certain capital structures, di¤erent layers of …nancial contracts permit a specialization in information acquisition. In other words, layers of capital structure correspond to specialized layers of information to be acquired. This specialization may in turn a¤ect the production of information and the e¢ ciency of monitoring, further reshaping the optimal capital structure. In this way, we can see that ‡exibility of information acquisition plays a role in determining the capital structure. Further results regarding its e¤ects on corporate …nance as well as on social welfare will come from future work.
An important observation: since V ( ) is a concave functional on M , V is upper bounded by any hyperplane tangent at any m 2 M , i.e., 8m; e m 2 M ,
This inequality is strict when
and Pr ( e m ( ) 6 = m ( )) > 0, since V ( ) is strictly concave on M o . This observation is helpful later in our proof.
The optimality of m requires
0 for all feasible perturbation ". Hence we must have
Note that Pr (m ( ) = 1) > 0 implies Pr (m ( ) = 1) = 1. Otherwise,
for all in set B = f 2 : m ( ) = 1g .
Thus " ( ) = 1 B is a feasible perturbation and
which contradicts the optimality of m. Hence we know that Pr (m ( ) = 1) > 0 if and only if Pr (m ( ) = 1) = 1. The same argument suggests that Pr (m ( ) = 0) > 0 if and only if Pr (m ( ) = 0) = 1. Therefore, the optimal strategy m must be one of the three scenarios: a) p 1 = 1, i.e., m ( ) = 1 a:s:; b) p 1 = 0, i.e., m ( ) = 0 a:s:; c) p 1 2 (0; 1) and m ( ) 2 (0; 1) a:s:.
We …rst search for the su¢ cient condition for scenario c). According to (24), m ( ) 2 (0; 1) a:s: implies
By de…nition,
Note that J (p 1 ) = p 1 is a necessary condition for the optimality of m ( ; p 1 ).
Since m ( ; p 1 ) 2 M 1 M , the original problem is reduced to
The …rst order derivative with respect to p is dV (m ( ; p)) dp
for all 2 , dV (m ( ; p)) dp 0 if and only if
Since g 0 is strictly increasing, we have dV (m ( ; p)) dp 0 if and only if J (p) p .
In order to be a global maximum, m ( ; p 1 ) must …rst be a local maximum within M 1 . This requires
But (27) is not su¢ cient. The su¢ cient condition for m ( ; p 1 ) to be a local maximum within M 1 is
Note that J (0) = 0; J (1) = 1 , dJ dp p=0 = E exp 1 u ( ) and dJ dp p=1 = E exp 1 u ( ) .
We proceed by discussing four possible cases.
In this case, J (p) > p for p close enough to 0 and J (p) < p for p close enough to 1. Since J (p) is continuous, the set fp 2 (0; 1) : J (p) = pg is non-empty. For any p 1 2 fp 2 (0; 1) :
and thus m ( ; p 1 ) is a critical point of functional V ( ). Since m ( ; p 1 ) 2 M o , the observation mentioned above implies
for all e m 2 M such that Pr ( e m ( ) 6 = m ( ; p 1 )) > 0. Hence, V (m ( ; p 1 )) is strictly higher than the values achieved at any other e m 2 M , i.e., fp 2 (0; 1) : J (p) = pg = fp 1 g and m ( ; p 1 ) is the unique global maximum. This actually proves (6).
Case ii):
case iv):
Case iv) cannot exists since Jensen's inequality implies
which suggests (34) and (35) hold with equality. This is true only if u ( ) = 0 almost surely, a trivial case excluded by our assumption. Since cases i), ii) and iii) exhaust all possibilities, for each case, the corresponding conditions are not only su¢ cient but also necessary.
The uniqueness of the optimal strategy is proved in each case. Note that the above proof of Proposition 1 applies to any abstract probability space . We do not have to require R. Especially, we generalize our benchmark model to accommodate multiple assets, i.e., = R N + . In this general setup, the security payment is contingent on By proposing the optimal contract (s ; q ), the seller's expected payo¤ should be no less than W (s; q) > 0. This directly implies p s ;q > 0, since p s ;q = 0 always generates zero expected payo¤ to the seller. Proof of Proposition 4. Proof. Let s ! = s ! + " ! be an arbitrary perturbation of the optimal security s . Let
Taking …rst order variation leads to 
For any ! 0 2 A 0 , (37) implies r ! 0 0, i.e.,
Together with (9), this inequality implies
Hence, 1 q ln s ln b < 0 , which is a contradiction. Therefore,
For any ! 0 2 A 1 , (37) implies r ! 0 = 0, i.e., 
is a constant for all ! 0 2 A 1 .
For any
! 0 2 A 2 , (37) implies r ! 0 0, i.e., We show that q > 0 and it is the unique …xed point of h (q).
By (9), we have q = ln E exp Hence, h (q) has a unique …xed point q > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. Proof. Taking derivative with respect to at = 0 for both sides of (13) Combining the above two equations leads to (15). Proof of Proposition 6. Proof. We …rst prove f 1 (0) > f 2 (0). If not, f 1 (s) < f 2 (s) for all s > 0. where the expectation operator E( ) is with respect to under common prior P . Since P is a continuous distribution and
